Some Tests of the Distinction Between the Private Self and the Collective Self

David Trafimow, Harry C. Triandis, and Sharon G. Goto
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

On the bases of Greenwald and Pratkanis's (1984) distinction between private and collective aspects of the self and on Triandis's (1989) theory about individualistic and collectivistic cultures, 2 competing theories concerning the organization of self-cognitions were proposed. Findings from 2 experiments supported the notion that private and collective self-cognitions are stored in separate locations in memory. First, Ss from individualistic cultures retrieved more cognitions about the private self, and fewer about the collective self, than Ss from collectivistic cultures. Second, priming a particular aspect of the self increased the retrieval of self-cognitions pertaining to that aspect of the self. Finally, the probability of retrieving a self-cognition was greater if the same type of self-cognition had been previously retrieved than if a different type had been previously retrieved.

Although psychologists have always been interested in the self (Allport, 1943; Gordon & Gergen, 1968; James, 1890/1950; Murphy, 1947; Ziller, 1973), the number of papers in the area has increased dramatically in the last decade (Baumeister, 1986a, 1986b, 1987; Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1985; Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, & Young, 1987; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Higgins, 1987; Markus & Wurf, 1987; McGuire, McGuire, & Cheever, 1986; Ogilvie, 1987; Rogers, 1981; Roland, 1984; Scheier & Carver, 1980; Schlenker, 1985; Snyder, 1987; Zavalloni & Louis-Guerin, 1984). For example, many researchers have considered the role of self in social cognition (see Wyer & Srull, 1989, for a review). Others (see Marsella, DeVos, & Hsu, 1985, for a review) have viewed the self from a cross-cultural perspective. In the present article, we will attempt to combine features of the social cognition and cross-cultural approaches to form a new context within which the self can be studied profitably (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991, for another integration of these areas).

Triandis's (1989) theory is the starting point for the present conceptualization. This theory incorporates Greenwald and Pratkanis's (1984) distinction between *private, collective,* and *public* aspects of the self. The private self includes cognitions that involve traits, states, or behaviors (e.g., "I am honest"). The collective self consists of cognitions about group membership (e.g., "I am a son," this concerns membership in the family). Finally, the public self includes cognitions about how some generalized other views the person (e.g., "People think I am honest.").

We would like to thank our anonymous reviewers and especially Robert Wyer for their constructive criticisms of an earlier version of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David Trafimow, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 East Daniel Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820.

Triandis (1989) commented on the possible effect of cultural background on the number of cognitions contained in the private self and the collective self. Using suggestions by Hofstede (1980) and Hsu (1981, 1983, 1985), he argued that the private self is emphasized more in individualistic cultures such as North America or Europe than in collectivistic cultures such as those of East Asia. However, the collective self is emphasized more in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures. It seems reasonable then to suppose that people with an individualistic cultural background will have more private self-cognitions, and fewer collective self-cognitions, than people from a collectivistic cultural background.

There are at least two ways that private and collective self-cognitions could be organized in memory. First, these cognitions may be stored in a single cognitive structure (i.e., the same place in memory), but with no internal organization. Thus, the likelihood of retrieving a self-cognition of a particular type (e.g., a private self-cognition) is determined by the frequency with which that type of self-cognition is represented, relative to the totality of self-cognitions. To use a rough analogy, consider a basket containing red and blue marbles. The probability of retrieving a red marble depends upon the number of red marbles, relative to the total number of marbles in the basket.

Another possibility is that self-cognitions are organized according to whether they pertain to the private or collective self. More specifically, private self-cognitions are organized around a general private self-concept, but collective self-cognitions are organized around a general collective self-concept. Thus, accessibility of different types of self-cognitions is largely determined by the relative accessibility of the private and collective self-concepts. To use the basket analogy again, consider two baskets of marbles, a red and a blue basket containing red and blue marbles, respectively. The probability of retrieving a red or blue marble depends upon which basket the person samples from.

Both theories predict that people with individualistic cul-

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1991, Vol. 60, No. 5, 649-655
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tural backgrounds are more likely to retrieve private self-cognitions, and fewer collective self-cognitions, than people with collectivistic cultural backgrounds. The one basket theory would assume that people from individualistic cultural backgrounds have more private self-cognitions in memory, and fewer collective self-cognitions in memory, than individuals with collectivistic cultural backgrounds. In contrast, the two baskets theory would arrive at the same prediction by assuming that one's cultural background determines the accessibility of the private and collective self-concepts. (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986, provided strong evidence that different concepts are chronically accessible for different people. Also, Srull, 1983, found that the accessibility of general concepts was related to the number of specific cognitions that exemplified the concept.) Thus, because the type of self-cognition retrieved depends on which self-concept is accessed, and the self-concept that is accessed depends on one's cultural background, the type of self-cognition retrieved depends on one's cultural background.

The two theories can be shown to make some different predictions. Suppose that a priming procedure is used to induce subjects to access either the private or collective self-concept. Several researchers (Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Higgins & King, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980; see also Wyer & Srull, 1986, for a review) have found that priming procedures affect the accessibility of concepts. The one basket theory would predict that because self-cognitions are not organized by type of self-concept, such a manipulation should not differentially affect the retrieval of private and collective self-cognitions. In contrast, the two baskets theory predicts that priming the private self-concept should increase the likelihood of retrieving private self-cognitions, whereas priming the collective self-concept should increase the likelihood of retrieving collective self-cognitions.

The two theories differ in another respect. According to the one basket theory, each self-cognition is retrieved independently. Thus, the probability of retrieving a self-cognition of a particular type does not depend upon which type of self-cognition was previously retrieved. In contrast, the two baskets theory argues that self-cognitions are *not* retrieved independently. Suppose someone retrieves a private self-cognition (a red marble). This private self-cognition must have been stored in a cognitive structure along with the private self-concept (in the red basket). Thus, the private self-concept must be the most accessible self-concept (the red basket is accessible). However, if the private self-concept is the most accessible self-concept, then the next self-cognition retrieved should be another private self-cognition (another red marble). In general, the two baskets theory predicts that the probability of someone retrieving a particular type of self-cognition, given that a similar type was previously retrieved, should be greater than if a different type of self-cognition had been previously retrieved.

This discussion suggests three hypotheses. First, both theories predict that people with individualistic cultural backgrounds will retrieve more private self-cognitions, and fewer collective self-cognitions, than people with collectivistic cultural backgrounds. Second, only the two baskets theory predicts that priming the private or collective self-concepts should increase the retrieval of private or collective self-cognitions, respectively. Third, only the two baskets theory predicts that the probability of retrieving a particular type of self-cognition increases if a similar type of self-cognition was previously retrieved.

To summarize then we have the following: *Hypothesis 1.* People from individualistic cultures, relative to people from collectivistic cultures, are more likely to retrieve private and less likely to retrieve collective self-cognitions. *Hypothesis 2.* Priming the private self will result in more retrieval of private self-cognitions; priming the collective self will result in more retrieval of collective self-cognitions. *Hypothesis 3.* The probability of retrieving a particular type of self-cognition increases if a similar type of self-cognition was previously retrieved.

Experiment 1

The present experiment provided a test of the three hypotheses. We obtained two groups of subjects, North Americans and Chinese, who could be assumed a priori to represent an individualistic or collectivistic culture, respectively (Triandis, 1990). The accessibility of their private or collective self-concepts was manipulated experimentally.

The dependent measure was the Kuhn and McPartland (1954) self-attitudes instrument, which requires completing 20 sentences that begin with "I am." We assumed that what we called *idiocentric* cognitions would be contained in private self-structures and that what we called *group* cognitions would be contained in collective self-structures. Idiocentric cognitions refer to personal qualities, attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors that do not relate to others. Group cognitions refer to demographic categories or groups with which the subject is likely to be experiencing "common fate." For example, the cognition "I am intelligent" is idiocentric, but the cognition "I am a Roman Catholic" is a group cognition.

On the basis of previous research (see Triandis, 1989) we also defined a third type of cognition that we call *allocentric.* These cognitions refer to a quality of interdependence, friendship, responsiveness to others, and sensitivity to the viewpoints of others. An example would be the cognition "I am a person who wants to help others." Because allocentric responses are not directly relevant to the proposed theory, they are not discussed in this article.

According to Hypothesis 1, North American students will make more idiocentric responses, but fewer group responses, than Chinese students. According to Hypothesis 2, regardless of culture, priming a private self-concept should lead subjects to make more idiocentric responses, but fewer group responses, than priming a collective self-concept. According to Hypothesis 3, the probability of an idiocentric response should be greater if the previous response was idiocentric than if it was a group response, whereas the probability of a group response should be greater if the previous response was a group response than if it was idiocentric.

Method

Subjects. The subjects were 42 introductory psychology students. Participation partially fulfilled a course requirement. Eighteen of the subjects were from a Chinese background, the rest were native English speakers from a North American cultural background.

It is necessary to explain how the subjects were selected. All introductory psychology students at the University of Illinois fill out cards that contain demographic information, including whether or not they are native English speakers. In addition, all of their names are entered into a computer so that they can be randomly selected for participation in various experiments. The North American subjects were obtained in this way. The Chinese subjects were obtained by going through all of the cards, and picking out everyone who had a Chinese name and was also *not* a native English speaker. At the close of the experiment, all subjects filled out a sheet where they disclosed their cultural backgrounds. This served as a check for our selection procedure.

Procedure. All subjects were given a booklet to fill out. On the first page, all subjects were reminded of their right to leave the experiment at any time. The main manipulation was performed on the second page. Both the Chinese and North American subjects were randomly split to receive either a private or a collective self-prime. Specifically, subjects in the private self-priming condition were instructed, "For the next two minutes, you will not need to write anything. Please think of what makes you different from your family and friends. What do you expect yourself to do?" Subjects in the collective self-priming condition were instructed, "For the next two minutes, you will not need to write anything. Please think of what you have in common with your family and friends. What do they expect you to do?"

On the third page, all subjects were given 5 minutes to complete the Kuhn and McPartland (1954) self-attitudes instrument described earlier. Content analysis of these responses, according to an idiocentrism/group count described below, was the dependent variable. Finally, all subjects filled out a page concerned with demographic information, and then they were debriefed.

Results

All of the booklets used in the experiment were arranged in a random order before the data from the "I am" sentences were coded. Each sentence was classified in one of three ways by two coders who were blind to the experimental conditions. Responses that referred to a personal quality, attitude, belief, or a behavior that was not related to other people were scored I (idiocentric). Responses that referred to a demographic category or a group with which the subject was likely to be experiencing "common fate" were scored G (group). Responses that referred to a quality of interdependence, friendship, responsiveness to others, or sensitivity to the viewpoints of others were scored A (allocentric).

Interrater reliability was assessed. The two coders agreed on 91% of the responses. In addition, a kappa statistic was calculated to control for agreement due to chance. Kappa was 0.74.

Proportions of response types. The results were analyzed as a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ mixed factorial with the following factors: Culture (subject was from a Chinese vs. North American cultural background) and prime (private vs. collective self) were the between-subjects factors. There were also two within-subjects factors. The proportion of each type of response (idiocentric vs. group) was one within-subjects factor. This was calculated by taking the number of idiocentric or group responses each subject made and dividing by the total number of responses made by that subject (the maximum number of responses possible for each subject was 20). Finally, we also broke the data down into two blocks to test for the stability of the priming manipulation. The first 5 responses composed the first block; the rest of the responses composed the second block.[1] Thus, block was the second within-subjects factor. These means are presented in Table 1.

Table 1
Proportion of Idiocentric and Group Responses as a Function of Block, Culture, and Prime

	Idiocentric		Group	
Prime	U.S.	China	U.S.	China
Block 1				
Private	.873	.633	.073	.300
Collective	.662	.433	.231	.517
Block 2				
Private	.848	.722	.044	.072
Collective	.752	.758	.187	.158

Before we test the hypotheses, it is worth mentioning a significant within-subjects main effect for response type, $F(1, 38) = 83.56$, $p < .001$. There was a greater proportion of idiocentric ($M = .71$) than group ($M = .20$) responses. This is not surprising considering that even the Chinese subjects have had considerable experience in the individualistic society of North America.

According to the first hypothesis, American subjects should give more idiocentric responses, and fewer group responses, than Chinese subjects. This prediction was confirmed by a significant Culture × Response Type interaction, $F(1, 38) = 6.66$, $p < .015$. American subjects gave a greater proportion of idiocentric responses than did Chinese subjects ($M = .783$ and $M = .637$), but a lower proportion of group responses ($M = .127$ and $M = .269$).

According to the second hypothesis, subjects who received the private self-prime should make more idiocentric responses, and fewer group responses, than subjects who received the collective self-prime. This prediction was confirmed by a significant Prime × Response Type interaction, $F(1, 38) = 5.75$, $p < .025$. Subjects who received the private self-prime made a greater proportion of idiocentric responses than those who received the collective self-prime ($M = .769$ and $M = .651$), but their proportion of group responses was less than that of subjects who received the collective self-prime ($M = .122$ and $M = .287$).

One could argue that the prime did not have anything to do with subjects' self-structures, but instead caused subjects to encode either idiocentric or group cognitions into their short-term memory systems. If this were true, then we would expect the effect of the prime to be short-lived, and consequently we would expect the obtained Prime × Response Type interaction in Block 1, but not in Block 2. In other words, we would expect a three-way Prime × Response Type × Block interaction. This did not occur, $F(1, 38) < 1$.

[1] According to Miller (1956), short-term memory capacity is approximately seven items. However, Hastie (1988) assumed three items in his computer simulation of person memory. We compromised and assumed that people normally keep five or fewer items in short-term memory.

Finally, a three-way Culture × Prime × Response Type interaction failed to materialize, $F(1, 38) < 1$.[2]

Conditional probabilities. According to the third hypothesis, the probability of an idiocentric response, given that the previous response is idiocentric, should be greater than if the previous response is a group response [$p(I/I) > p(I/G)$]. In addition, the probability of a group response, given that the previous response is a group response, should be greater than if the previous response is idiocentric [$p(G/G) > p(G/I)$]. These conditional probabilities were calculated for each subject. Many subjects only gave one or zero group responses, thereby rendering $p(G/G)$ meaningless. Consequently, only those subjects that gave at least 2 idiocentric and 2 group responses were included in the analysis (17 subjects fit these criteria). Mean conditional probabilities were obtained and compared with each other to test the predictions. Consistent with expectations $p(I/I) = 0.74 > p(I/G) = 0.47$ and $p(G/G) = 0.42 > p(G/I) = 0.16$. Bonferroni tests were used to test for significance at alpha = .01. Both differences were significant, thereby supporting the third hypothesis.

Experiment 2

Although the data from Experiment 1 support the two baskets theory, it is possible that there was something idiosyncratic about the priming procedure, and that the obtained Prime × Response Type interaction might not replicate with another prime. In addition, it is generally desirable to perform a conceptual replication of interesting findings. Consequently, we attempted to replicate Experiment 1 by using a different priming procedure.

Method

Subjects. Forty-eight undergraduates participated in the experiment as part of a class demonstration. All of them had a North American cultural background. Unfortunately, an insufficient number of Chinese subjects were available for this replication. However, the predicted Prime × Response Type interaction and the results of the conditional probability analysis are theoretically independent of subjects' cultural background.

Procedure. All subjects were given a three-page booklet to fill out. On the first page, all subjects read, "We would like you to read a couple of paragraphs on the following page. After reading these paragraphs, you will be asked to make a judgment about the main character. On the third page, you will be asked to do an additional task." On the second page, the priming manipulation was performed. All subjects read a short story that started "Sostoras, a warrior in ancient Sumer, was largely responsible for the success of Sargon I in conquering all of Mesopotamia. As a result, he was rewarded with a small kingdom of his own to rule.

About 10 years later, Sargon I was conscripting warriors for a new war. Sostoras was obligated to send a detachment of soldiers to aid Sargon I. He had to decide who to put in command of the detachment. After thinking about it for a long time, Sostoras eventually decided on Tiglath who was a . . ."

At this point, subjects received the priming manipulation. In the *private self-prime* condition, the story continued ". . . talented general. This appointment had several advantages. Sostoras was able to make an excellent general indebted to him. This would solidify Sostoras's hold on his own dominion. In addition, the very fact of having a general such as Tiglath as his personal representative would greatly increase Sostoras's prestige. Finally, sending his best general would be likely to make Sargon I grateful. Consequently, there was the possibility of getting rewarded by Sargon I."

In the *collective self-prime* condition, the story continued ". . . member of his family. This appointment had several advantages. Sostoras was able to show his loyalty to his family. He was also able to cement their loyalty to him. In addition, having Tiglath as the commander increased the power and prestige of the family. Finally, if Tiglath performed well, Sargon I would be indebted to the family." Finally, all subjects answered the question "Do you admire Sostoras? Circle the appropriate answer." The choices were yes, no, and not sure.

On the third page, all subjects completed the Kuhn and McPartland (1954) self-attitudes instrument that was used in Experiment 1. They were given 6 min to read the story and to fill out the self-attitudes instrument.

Results

As in Experiment 1, all of the booklets were arranged in a random order before the data from the "I am" sentences were coded. Each sentence was classified as being idiocentric, group, or allocentric by two coders who were blind to the experimental conditions. Interrater reliability was assessed. The two coders agreed on 92% of the responses. In addition, a kappa statistic was calculated to control for agreement due to chance. Kappa was .82.

The proportions of response types. The results were analyzed as a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed factorial with the following factors: Prime (private vs. collective self) was the between-subjects factor. The proportion of each type of response (idiocentric vs. group) was one within-subjects factor. Block (the first five items vs. the rest of the items) was the other within-subjects factor. These means are presented in Table 2.

As in Experiment 1, there was a main effect for response type, $F(1, 45) = 116.51$, $p < .001$. There was a greater proportion of idiocentric ($M = .698$) than group ($M = .150$) responses. More important, we also replicated the Prime × Response Type interaction, $F(1, 45) = 8.43$, $p < .007$. Subjects who received the private self-prime made a greater proportion of idiocentric responses than those who received the collective self-prime ($M = .800$ and $M = .575$), but their proportion of group responses was less than that of subjects who received the collective self-prime ($M = .087$ and $M = .217$). Finally, as in Experiment 1, the Prime × Response Type interaction was not modified by block, $F(1, 45) < 1$.

Conditional probabilities. Conditional probabilities were calculated for each subject who gave at least two idiocentric and two group responses (20 subjects fit these criteria). As in Exper-

[2] Our results run counter to Wyer & Srull's (1981, 1986) "bin" model of concept accessibility. As Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, and Tota (1986) stated, "In that model, frequency of construct use has an effect on accessibility only through its recency of use: The more frequently a construct is activated, the greater is the likelihood that it has been used recently. Thus, no effect of frequency independent of recency should occur" (p. 876). If we think of cultural background as affecting frequency, and of the priming manipulation as affecting recency, the bin model predicts an interaction between culture and priming on retrieval. Contrary to this, but consistent with the proposed theory and with Bargh et al.'s findings, these effects were additive.

Table 2
Proportion of Idiocentric and Group Responses as a Function of Block and Prime

	Idiocentric		Group	
Prime	Block 1	Block 2	Block 1	Block 2
Private	.800	.777	.087	.099
Collective	.575	.639	.217	.196

iment 1, the predicted pattern of mean conditional probabilities was obtained, $p(I/I) = .73 > p(I/G) = .51$ and $p(G/G) = .46 > p(G/I) = .17$. Bonferroni tests were used to test for significance at alpha = .01. Both differences were significant.

Discussion

The results of both experiments can be summarized as follows. First, people from individualistic cultures gave more idiocentric, and fewer group responses, than people from collectivistic cultures. Second, regardless of cultural background, different priming procedures successfully stimulated the retrieval of either idiocentric or group cognitions. Third, the probability of an idiocentric or group response was greater if the previous response was similar than if it was different. Taken together, these findings are all consistent with the two baskets theory, but the second and third findings contradict the one basket theory of storage of self-cognitions. More generally, these findings show that the distinction between the private self and the collective self is meaningful and has important consequences for the retrieval of self-cognitions.

A Single Self-Structure?

The fact that the one basket theory was contradicted by the data does not invalidate all possible one-structure theories. In other words, it might be possible to construct a theory that incorporates the distinction between private and collective self-cognitions. For example, a one-structure theory could account for the conditional probability data by assuming that although cognitions from all aspects of the self are stored together, self-cognitions are more strongly associated with similar than with different types of self-cognitions.

The effects of the priming manipulations present a problem, however. The priming procedures used presumably induced subjects to access a particular cognitive concept (i.e., either the private or collective self-concept). But if cognitions pertaining to all aspects of the self are stored in the same cognitive structure (i.e., linked to the same self-concept), retrieval of all types of self-cognitions should have been affected equally by the priming procedures. The data clearly contradict this. Consequently, to save the one-structure notion, we must make one of the following assumptions. First, we can assume that the priming procedure affected the retrieval of some types of self-cognitions while not affecting the retrieval of others, even though they are all linked to the same self-concept. In other words, we can assume "bottom-up" priming effects.

Second, we can assume a hierarchical theory with (1) a top-level self-concept, (2) second-level private and collective self-concepts, and (3) lower-level private and collective self-cognitions that are linked to the private and collective self-concepts, respectively. This theory would further assume that the priming manipulation activated each subject's private or collective self-concept, thereby increasing the accessibility of the self-cognitions linked to the activated self-concept. The hierarchical theory has an important, although not decisive, advantage over the other one-structure theory. Most previous work on priming has been concerned with the priming of concepts, and not with the priming of specific cognitions (see Wyer & Srull, 1986, 1989, for reviews). Assuming bottom-up priming effects on the retrieval of particular cognitions goes considerably beyond previous literature (see Srull, 1981; Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985, for evidence against bottom-up retrieval in the person memory area).

Another advantage of the hierarchical theory over the other one-structure theory is the long-lasting effects of the priming manipulations. If only particular cognitions were primed, as the other one-structure theory assumes, then subjects would presumably write down the primed cognitions and then write down the rest of the cognitions contained in the structure. Thus, the priming manipulations should have affected retrieval of the first block of items, only. However, Table 2 shows that the priming manipulations affected the second block as well. This is consistent with the hierarchical theory and the two baskets theory.

Actually, the hierarchical theory is very similar to the two baskets theory presented earlier. Both assume that private and collective self-cognitions are stored in separate locations (i.e., by private and collective self-concepts, respectively). The main difference is that the two baskets theory does not assume that private and collective self-concepts are linked to a more general self-concept. Thus, the two baskets theory is more parsimonious. But if future findings support the existence of a general self-concept, then the two baskets theory may ultimately have to be rejected. At this point, however, such data are not yet available (see Higgins & Bargh, 1987).

How Many Baskets Contain Self-Cognitions?

We have argued that the distinction between private and collective self-cognitions is both meaningful and important. The two baskets theory was a convenient way of explaining this distinction. One could take this idea a step further and argue that there are several types of private and collective self-cognitions. For example, suppose a person often thinks about his or her athletic and musical ability. These are all private self-cognitions and might further be labeled as athletic or musical self-cognitions. All of these private self-cognitions might be stored in the same location in memory (in one basket containing all private self-cognitions) or in separate locations (musical and athletic private self-cognitions are stored in different baskets). Similarly, various types of collective self-cognitions could be stored in the same location in memory or in separate locations.

Because the present data have little to say about whether there are one or many types of private and collective self-cognitions, there is currently no way of distinguishing between three possible effects of cultural background on the accessibility of

self-cognitions. First, cultural background may affect the relative accessibility of one private and one collective self-concept (which basket is accessible). Second, cultural background may affect the number of private or collective self-concepts that are available for retrieval (the number of baskets of each type). Finally, cultural background may affect the number of self-cognitions that are linked to particular self-concepts (the number of self-cognitions stored in particular baskets). These possibilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Interdependence of the Cross-Cultural and Social Cognition Areas

The present research combines literature from the cross-cultural and social cognition areas. We would like to argue that it provides a demonstration of how theoretical and empirical benefits can accrue by combining theories and data from different literatures.

Some researchers (see Pepitone & Triandis, 1988, p. 491) have argued that there are studies in social psychology that do not replicate when performed in other cultures. Although we agree that this is an important concern, we would also like to make a more subtle point. In the present paradigm, we did not try to generalize previous findings to other cultures; rather, we took findings from other cultures (especially regarding the individualism–collectivism dimension) and used them to form a new conceptualization capable of making new predictions. It is interesting to note that except for the Cultural Background × Response Type interaction, the rest of the data did *not* depend upon having subjects from different cultures. In other words, by combining the social cognition and cross-cultural areas, we can (a) perform *some* tests of cross-cultural theories without having to use subjects from different cultures and (b) expand our theorizing to include the *contents* of memory rather than just the structure and processes.

Bringing Culture Into the Laboratory

It is widely recognized that "culture" is a fuzzy concept that is difficult to define (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952) and impossible to operationalize. However, when cross-cultural studies reveal an attribute of the construct and we can operationalize that attribute in the laboratory, we can bring culture into the laboratory and gradually "unpeel the onion" that is culture. The demonstration that we can manipulate the individualism–collectivism perspective by asking people to think of what makes them different/similar to a collective, or by reading a text reflecting individualistic/collectivistic behaviors, and thus obtain scores on an instrument that are almost identical to the scores one obtains in individualistic/collectivistic cultures in the field (Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990) opens the way toward an examination of culture in the laboratory. The strategy is to identify key attributes of contrasting cultures and then devise laboratory manipulations that result in obtaining similar phenomena in the laboratory and the field. Another example is that Ziller's (1965) open and closed groups behave in ways that correspond to the way individualists and collectivists behave (for a review, see Triandis, 1990). Thus the present article is a first attempt to bring culture into the laboratory in a self-conscious way, and it ought to provide an opening for a new line of research.

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Received May 28, 1990
Revision received October 22, 1990
Accepted December 13, 1990 ■